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Abstract. An increasing number of businesses are replacing their data
storage and computation infrastructure with cloud services. Likewise,
there is an increased emphasis on performing analytics based on multi-
ple datasets obtained from different data sources. While ensuring security
of data and computation outsourced to a third party cloud is in itself
challenging, supporting analytics using data distributed across multiple,
independent clouds is even further from trivial. In this paper we present
CloudMine, a cloud-based service which allows multiple data owners to
perform privacy-preserved computation over the joint data using their
clouds as delegates. CloudMine protects data privacy with respect to
semi-honest data owners and semi-honest clouds. It furthermore ensures
the privacy of the computation outputs from the curious clouds. It al-
lows data owners to reliably detect if their cloud delegates have been
lazy when carrying out the delegated computation. CloudMine can run
as a centralized service on a single cloud, or as a distributed service over
multiple, independent clouds. CloudMine supports a set of basic com-
putations that can be used to construct a variety of highly complex,
distributed privacy-preserving data analytics. We demonstrate how a
simple instance of CloudMine (secure sum service) is used to implement
three classical data mining tasks (classification, association rule mining
and clustering) in a cloud environment. We experiment with a prototype
of the service, the results of which suggest its practicality for supporting
privacy-preserving data analytics as a (multi) cloud-based service.
Keywords: delegated multiparty computation, privacy-preserving data analyt-
ics, multi-cloud, cloud service
1 Introduction
An enormous amount of data is being generated everyday from a plethora of
computing devices. Traditionally, data is stored in the data owner’s in-house
infrastructure, and access to outsiders is provided typically through web ser-
vices [5,2,3]. Data from multiple sources can be mashed-up or jointly analyzed
to create new services and derive information that cannot be realized from indi-
vidual datasets [20,17,6]. However, it is often desirable or even required by law
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to protect data privacy. Although numerous techniques for carrying out privacy-
preserving data analytics exist ([26,15,44]), we believe that for wide-scale adop-
tion of such techniques, it is essential to provide them as basic, out-of-the-box
services which are flexible enough, so that individual users can freely choose their
respective service providers, and yet be able to collaborate among each other.
Recent developments of cloud computing have materialized a concrete plat-
form for rapid realization of the service-oriented computing paradigm [43]. Cloud
providers (Google, Amazon, Salesforce, etc.) offer computing as a service, from
which software services can be built, sold and integrated into complex appli-
cations. Migration of private IT infrastructures to the cloud is gathering mo-
mentum [24,38], as many companies and government agencies are moving most
(or all) of their data, application logics and front-end services to the cloud. Re-
cent advances in cloud computing have largely succeeded in accommodating the
demand for cheap, elastic and scalable computing resources. However, security
issues related to the outsourced data and computation remain a challenging
obstacle to overcome [34,41].
Our work is motivated by the realization of these two trends, namely the need
for a service for privacy-preserving analytics and the availability of cloud com-
puting as a platform for service-oriented computing. More specifically, this work
concerns the design space of a cloud-based service for carrying out distributed,
privacy-preserving data analytics. We present CloudMine, a cloud-based, on-
demand service that data owners can leverage to perform analytics over their
joint data. CloudMine runs on the cloud (or delegate) and supports three basic
functions: secure sum, secure set union and intersection, secure scalar product.
CloudMine provides three security assurances. First, confidentiality of individ-
ual’s data is protected from other semi-honest data owners, as well as from
colluding, semi-honest clouds. Second, outputs of the joint computations are
protected from the semi-honest clouds. Third, data owners can reliably detect if
their delegates have been lazy, i.e. if they have skipped the computations.
CloudMine can be used in a centralized manner when all the data owners
use the same service on a single cloud. More importantly, it also works well
in distributed settings where different data owners invoke different services on
their delegates. In such setting, multiple instances of CloudMine participate in
a distributed protocol in order to achieve the same functionality. The security
properties of CloudMine are still guaranteed in this distributed environment,
even when the clouds collude with each other.
A use case of CloudMine is illustrated in the following example. Suppose there
is a number of supermarkets wishing to learn customer purchase behavior by
performing association rule mining over their joint data. Each supermarket stores
their customer transaction data in-house because the data contains sensitive
information, while outsourcing the rest of its IT operation to the cloud. Suppose
the supermarkets would like to outsourcing the computation (association rule
mining) to their delegate clouds, without revealing their sensitive data to the
clouds and to each other. Since the customer purchase behavior (output of the
computation) is valuable to the participating supermarkets, they will like it
to be kept secret from the clouds (for otherwise, the latter can benefit from
the information without contributing any data). They will also like to be able
to detect if their clouds have been unscrupulous, i.e. skipping the delegated
computations while still charging them for the same. Such lazy behavior could
undermine accuracy of the final result. CloudMine meets these functionality
and security requirements, and it can be readily invoked on the clouds. First,
CloudMine supports set intersection and sum operations, which can be used to
carry out association rule mining [13]. Next, CloudMine protects confidentiality
of data owner’s input from other data owners and from the clouds, thus the
supermarkets can be assured of the data privacy from each other and from the
clouds. In addition, CloudMine protects output of the computation from the
clouds, therefore the result from association rule mining is only learned by the
participating supermarkets. Finally, CloudMine allows data owners to detect
lazy clouds, thus the supermarkets can use CloudMine to verify if their clouds
have been unscrupulous.
Privacy-preserving data analytics is an active area of research. Existing tech-
niques are based on either a generic secure multi-party computation [45,44], or
on using a semi-honest third party [15,26]. Our work distinguishes itself from
the former in that the clouds are used as delegated computation units, hence it
is more scalable. It differs from the latter in that we consider a stronger adver-
sary model for the cloud delegates. Especially, we consider colluding adversaries
who try to learn both the inputs and outputs of the computation while doing
as little as possible. Furthermore, while previous works consider ad-hoc sets of
data analytic tasks, each focusing on one primitive function (mostly secure sum
function), CloudMine is designed as a service with a large set of analytic func-
tions including secure sum, set operations and scalar products. We defer more
detailed discussion to the next section.
The key enabling technique used in CloudMine is additive homomorphic en-
cryption [32], which allows data owners to encrypt their private inputs before
exporting it to the CloudMine cloud delegate. The ciphertexts contain addi-
tional information to allow for verification of computation. Secure set operations
(intersection and union) are reduced to secure sum operations by encoding set
membership into the plain-text inputs. Scalar product is computed by leveraging
the homomorphic property of Paillier encryption and the secure sum function.
In all cases, the keys are kept secret from the clouds, hence they are unable to
decrypt the outputs.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We present a model for cloud-based services for distributed, privacy-preserving
data analytics. The model allows data owners to outsource their private com-
putations to the cloud in a privacy-preserved manner.
2. We describe how the service can be implemented to support a number of
cardinal data analytic functions, namely secure sum, secure set operations,
and secure scalar product. We name the service CloudMine.
3. We demonstrate how CloudMine can be used for more complex data mining
tasks — namely classification, association rule mining and clustering — in
a hybrid cloud setting. In particular, we show how CloudMine works when
some parts of the data are stored in encrypted form in the public clouds.
4. We benchmark CloudMine on a cloud platform, both as a stand-alone service
and as a part of more complex data mining applications. The results suggest
that the overheads incurred because of the added security mechanism are
reasonable and amortized as the workload increases. They indicate that it
is practical to outsource distributed, privacy-preserving data analytics to a
(multi) cloud service.
In the next section, we discuss in detail the system and adversary model
of CloudMine. Section 3 delineate the CloudMine protocols for various analytic
functions. Section 4 describes how three classic data mining tasks can be built
using an instance of CloudMine in a hybrid cloud setting. Section 5 follows with
experimental evaluation before related works are discussed in Section 6. We
conclude and outline some planned future work in Section 7.
2 CloudMine Model
2.1 System Model
The system using CloudMine consists of two kinds of entities: data owners (or
parties) and clouds (or delegates). The data owners P = {P0, P1, .., Pn−1}
wish to compute a function f(x0, x1, .., xn−1) where xi is the input of Pi, without
revealing the input to each other. The clouds C = {C0, C1, .., Ck−1} where k ≤ n
are the service providers. Each party uses one of these cloud, and each cloud is
utilized by at least one party. Denote δ(i) ∈ C as the delegate used by party Pi.
At a high level, data owners use CloudMine in two steps in order to compute
f(.). First, they enter the setup phase, in which they agree on a function φ (and
φ−1) and a secret sk. Next, each party Pi computes φsk(xi) and sends it to the
delegate δ(i). In turn, the delegates exchange messages among themselves and
effectively compute pi = φsk(f(x0, x1, ..)). The data owners receive pi from their
respective delegates and compute φ−1sk (pi) = f(x0, x1, ..).
2.2 Adversary model
Data owners / parties are curious but honest. They follow the protocol for
computing f(.) correctly, but passively try to learn the private inputs of each
other. They could collude with each other, but the number of colluding parties
is less than n− 1.
Clouds/Delegates are curious and lazy. They are curious with respect to
the parties’ private inputs as well as the output of f(.). They do not actively
subvert the computation, but are lazy in the sense that they try to do as little
as possible while charging the data owners for the same. For example, they may
skip some (or all) of the computations, replay results from the previous rounds,
or even replace inputs from the data owners with other values in order to avoid
computation. This model is justified by the economic incentives of the cloud
providers to over-charge customers without being detected [42], as well as the
legal realities in which the clouds can sniff sensitive information without the
liability of committing a criminal offense.
The collusion between parties and delegates is weak. In particular, the dele-
gates may reveal the messages exchanged during the computation of φ(f(.)) to
the parties, but the shared secret between the parties are not revealed to the
delegates. If the shared secret is revealed, it is not possible to guarantee privacy
of the computation output.
2.3 Security goals
Given the model above, CloudMine aims to provide the following security assur-
ances:
1. Data owners cannot learn each other’s private inputs.
2. Delegates cannot learn the parties’ private inputs, nor can they learn the
output f(.).
3. Delegates cannot skip, replay or replace inputs of the delegated computations
without being detected by the parties.
2.4 Discussion
Existing works on multi-party private computation, which underlie privacy-
preserving data analytics, can be grouped into two different approaches. The
first is based on secure multi-party computation, in which data owners interact
with each other directly to evaluate a function based on their private inputs. For
example, [40,44] use generic multi-party computation circuits [45]. The second
approach is based on a third party, in which data owners send their encrypted
inputs to the third party which evaluates the function. [15,36,26], for instance,
follow this approach.
Our model differs to the secure multi-party computation approach mainly in
that the parties delegate their computations to the clouds. As a result, instead
of interacting with each other, which does not scale well with the size of n,
each party only interacts with its delegate. More importantly, this model allows
for much more efficient implementation of the private computation than using
generic, circuit evaluation (which takes in the order of seconds to compute a
2-party secure sum [15]).
Our model share some similarities with the second approach. On one hand,
when k = 1, the system model of CloudMine is the same as in many other works
which rely on a single third party. On the other hand, CloudMine distinguishes
itself in a number of aspects. First, we consider the case when there are multiple,
independent third parties that each data owner can individually choose to use as
delegate. CloudMine is designed to resist collusion among these delegates. This
is different from [15] which also supports multiple servers, but they are assumed
to be non-colluding. Second, CloudMine adversary model considers the delegates
trying passively to learn the output of f(.), which is not the case in previous
work. We believe such outputs may leak sensitive information. For example, the
clouds may use the aggregate (sum) values together with off-line knowledge to
derive sensitive information [16], or they may directly infer parts of the data
owners’ private inputs from the output of the set intersection function. Third,
we consider the clouds to be lazy which may skip the delegated computation and
subsequently render the output f(.) incorrect. This behavior presents a realistic
threat to the utility and integrity of the analytics, yet it has not been addressed
in existing works.
Finally, designing CloudMine as a service on the cloud has another benefit
with respect to scalability. Since the cloud maintains the service, it can monitor
the workload and automatically add more resources to deal with increases in
workload. This automatic, seamless scaling is an essential practical improvement
over systems such as [15] which require complete reconfiguration and re-run of
the protocols to accommodate more servers.
3 CloudMine Implementation
We now describe how to implement the CloudMine service to support three
analytic functions: secure sum, secure set operations (intersection and union),
and secure scalar product. These primitives serve as a powerful toolbox for doing
privacy-preserving analytics, ranging from database queries such as join [31] and
aggregate [26] to complex mining algorithms such as collaborative filtering [15].
CloudMine relies on an additively homomorphic encryption scheme to pro-
tect privacy of the data owners’ inputs and to implement the basic secure sum
function. In particular, we use Paillier [32], a randomized encryption scheme
consisting of three algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) where Enc and Dec are encryption
and decryption algorithms which use the key generated by Gen. Paillier has the
following property:
Enc(eK,m1).Enc(eK,m2) = Enc(eK,m1 +m2)
where eK is the encryption key. Compared to other additively homomorphic
schemes based on Elgamal [39], Paillier requires longer bit-length. But we can
overcome this by packing multiple inputs into a single plaintext so that they can
be encrypted and decrypted at the same time [34]. Suppose the inputs are at
most b bits and Paillier’s plaintexts are bl bits. Suppose further that any sum
value is smaller than 2t+b for some values of t, then we can pack c inputs into a
single plaintext (where c ≤ d blb+te) as follows:
〈x1‖x2‖..‖xc〉 = z‖x1‖z′‖x2..‖z′‖xc
where z′ contains t bits of 0 and z contains (bl− c.(t+ b)) bits of 0.
In the following, we describe the construction of three services that constitute
CloudMine. The secure sum service implements the aggregate function, secure
set service the set union and intersection function, and secure scalar service the
scalar product function.
3.1 Secure Sum Service
The secure sum service, denoted as Ssum, consists of five protocols: Ssum =
(Setup,KeyGen,MaskGen,ComputeSum,Verify). The first three protocols are per-
formed once at the beginning, while ComputeSum and Verify are invoked for each
round of computation.
– Setup(κ): generate public parameters with κ being the security parameter.
The result is the tuple:
PK = (gid,RNG,Gp(g),Gen, b, bl)
where gid identifies the group to which all parties belong, RNG is a random
number generator, Gp(g) is an algebraic group of prime order p and generator
g, Gen is an algorithm for generating Paillier keys. b and bl are bit lengths
of the inputs and Paillier plaintexts respectively.
– KeyGen(PK): data owners execute this protocol to establish a share secret:
SK = (eK, dK, rId)
where (eK, dK) is a Paillier key pair and rId is a random number identifying
the initial round of computation. First, the parties follow the protocols as
proposed in [11] to generate a secret x ∈ Gp using the clouds and without
the latter learning x. Next, they use x as the seed to initialize the random
number generator RNG, which is then used by Gen to generate (eK, dK).
Finally, the parties assign the next random number generated by RNG as
rId.
– MaskGen(i,PK): each party Pi invokes this protocol to generate its own
secret
MaKi = (ri, ηi)
such that ri, ηi are random values from an algebraic group of specific size,
ηi 6= 0 and the sum of ri and ηi across all data owners are known, i.e.∑
i ri =
∑
i ηi = 0.
First, Pi creates random values rij and ηij (using its private source of ran-
domness) for all Pj (i 6= j) belonging to the group gid. Next, rij and ηij are
encrypted with Pj ’s public key and sent to δ(i) which subsequently forwards
them to Pj . Having received the encrypted rji, ηji from its delegate, Pi then
computes
ri =
∑
i 6=j
(rij − rji) ηi =
∑
i6=j
(ηij − ηji)
It can be seen that Pj cannot learn ri, ηi for i 6= j, and that
∑
i ri =
∑
i ηi =
0.
– ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, xi): each party Pi constructs the ciphertext
ci for its private input xi as follows:
ci = Enc(eK, 〈ηi||rId||(xi + ri)〉)
It then sends ci to its delegate which then broadcasts it to the other delegates.
Finally, each delegate computes:
c =
∏
ci = Enc(eK, 〈
∑
ηi||n.rId||
∑
xi〉)
and forwards it to the party. Finally, Pi invokes Verify(i,PK,SK,MaKi, c).
If the result of this verification protocol is y 6= ⊥, the party returns y as the
final sum.
– ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, xi): takes as parameter a vector of inputs xi
instead of a single input. Let s = d bl−2(br+dlog2ne)br+b e where br is the bit length
of ηi and rId. For 0 ≤ k < d b.|xi|s e, we construct message mk as follows:
mk = 〈xk.s‖xk.s+1‖..‖x(k+1).s−1〉
where |mk| = bl − 2(br + dlog2ne) bit. For each mk, the party invokes
ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaK,mk). If the result y 6= ⊥, it extracts the sums
yk.s, yk.s+1, .., y(k+1).s−1 from y. After each invocation, the party increments
rId and updates SK accordingly.
– Verify(i,PK,SK,MaKi, c): each party decrypts the ciphertext c and checks
that the result is of the following form:
Dec(dK, c) = 〈0||n.rId||y〉
If true, y is returned as the final sum.
Discussion. We now discuss how the protocols above meet the security require-
ments listed in Section 2. First, data owners cannot learn each other’s inputs,
because each input xi has been masked with a secret value ri. Second, delegates
cannot extract the sum
∑
i xi from the ciphertext c, because they do not have ac-
cess to the decryption key dK. Third, delegates cannot replay old values without
being detected, since each ciphertext is embedded with a fresh value of rId. They
cannot replace ci with another valid ciphertext either, because they do not have
access to (eK, ri, ηi), thus invalid ciphertexts will be detected by the verification
protocol. Neither can they skip some (or all) of the inputs for the computation
of c =
∏
ci, because it will cause verification to fail, since Dec(c) 6= 〈0||n.rId||y〉.
Finally, each delegate can compute c = cni (raising to the power of n may be
cheaper than n multiplications), which makes the second element of Dec(c) to
be the same as n.rId. However, verification will still fail, because n.ηi 6= 0.
Security of Ssum depends on the fact that delegates do not know the shared
secret SK or the data owner secret MaKi. Every party i must protect MaKi from
other parties . To ensure long-term security, it is important to refresh SK as well
as MaKi, albeit refreshing the latter can be done after longer intervals. This can
be achieved by invoking KeyGen and MaskGen again. Alternatively, if Pi stores
the original {rij , rji, ηij , ηji | j 6= i}, the new MaKi can be computed as:
r′i =
∑
i 6=j
(H(rij)−H(rji)) η′i =
∑
i 6=j
(H(ηij)−H(ηji))
where H is a cryptographic hash function.
The verification of delegate behavior relies on the party encoding its se-
cret MaKi to the ciphertexts. As a consequence, the memory overhead is o =
2.(br+log2n)
bl , which decreases as the Paillier bit-length bl increases. The Verify
protocol is performed at the end of every ComputeSum protocol. This can be-
come overhead when there are many rounds of computations. Hence, we extend
Ssum to allow parties to invoke Verify only with a probability p. The probability
of successfully detecting consistent misbehavior, pv, can be made arbitrarily high
after a number of verification. Specifically, pv = 1 − (1 − p)n.k where k is the
number of random checks.
3.2 Secure Set Service
The service for secure set union and intersection can be built directly from the
secure sum service. Intuitively, the input sets are encoded into plaintext messages
which are used as inputs for Ssum. The union or intersection set is then decoded
from the final sum values.
The secure set service, denoted as Sset, consists of five protocols:
Sset = (Setup,KeyGen,MaskGen,ComputeUnion,
ComputeIntersect).
– Setup, KeyGen, MaskGen are the same as in the secure sum service, except
that the public parameter PK also contains a universal domain U .
– ComputeUnion(i,PK,SK,MaKi, xi): each party inputs a vector xi ∈ U∗ and
computes the union set as follows. A vector I = (a0, .., a|U |−1) is constructed,
in which ai = 1 if U [i] ∈ xi and ai = 0 otherwise. The party then in-
vokes ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, I). When the secure sum service returns
s0, s1, .., s|U |−1, it computes {U [i] | si ≥ 1} as the union set.
– ComputeIntersect(i,PK,SK,MaKi, xi) works in the same way as ComputeUnion,
except that the intersection set is computed as {U [i] | si = n}.
Discussion. This service has the same security properties as for secure sum.
The number of encryptions per set operation is d |U |(log2n+1)bl−2(log2n+b)e, which grows
linearly with the size of U . Consequently, our protocols may not scale well when
U and n are very large (for example, in orders of millions as in the case of large-
scale collaborative filtering). Other protocols for private set operations which
scale more gracefully ([25,31]) do not apply to our delegate model. In practice,
many applications involving secure set operations have small- to medium-size
U (in orders of ten or hundred) [4], which renders our protocols practical. For
example, for 100 data owners, |U | = 1000, bl = 1024, b = 16, the protocols
need only 9 encryptions. We believe that for current applications, this cost is
reasonable.
3.3 Secure Scalar Service
Data owners are divided into two disjoint groups X, Y . Let x and y be two
vectors in which xi is the private input of party Xi, yi the private input of Yi.
The secure scalar service, Ssp allow the data owners in both groups to compute
p = x.y = x0.y0 + x1.y1 + ..+ xn−1
2
.yn−1
2
Ssp consists of four protocols (Setup,KeyGen,MaskGen,ComputeScalar), and
it also makes use the secure sum service.
– Setup(κ) is the similar to that in Ssum. It outputs public the parameter:
PK = (gidx, gidy,RNG,Gp(g),Gen, b, bl)
where gidx and gidy are identities of group X and Y respectively.
– KeyGen(gid,PK): parties that belong to the group gid execute this protocol
to establish a shared secret among them. The protocol is the same as in
Ssum, and the result is
SKgid = (eKgid, dKgid, rIdgid)
– MaskGen(i, gid,PK): each party i in group gid first generates a Paillier key
pair (eK′gid,i, dK
′
gid,i). Next, it generates two values rgid,i, ηgid,i in the same
way as in Ssum, i.e. ηgid,i 6= 0 and
∑
i ηgid,i =
∑
i rgid,i = 0. Denote
MaKgid,i = (dKgid,i, rgid,i, ηgid,i)
as the secret of party i in group gid. Also, let
PK′ = {eK′gidx,i} ∪ {eK
′
gidy,i
}
be another set of public parameters.
– ComputeScalar(i, gid,PK,PK′,SKgid,MaKgid,i, xi): party i in group gid exe-
cutes this protocol to compute the global scalar product. Suppose the party
is Xi (belonging to group X, and gid = gidx), the protocol proceeds as
follows:
1. Xi sends mi = Enc(eK
′
gidy,i
, xi) to its delegate which then forwards it to
Yi.
2. Yi computes ci = m
yi
i .Enc(eK
′
gidx,i
, rgidy,i) and sends it back to Xi via
its delegate.
3. Xi computes z = Dec(dK
′
gidx,i
, ci) = xi.yi + rgidy,i. It then invokes the
service sum service ComputeSum(i,PK,SKgid,MaKgrid,i, z), the result of
which is the scalar product.
Discussion. The intuition behind ComputeScalar protocol is for Xi to compute
the value (xi.yi + rgid,i) without knowing yi. This is then aggregated with the
other values from Xj (i 6= j) to cancel out rgidy,i and obtain the scalar product.
This works because of the homomorphic property of Paillier and the fact that∑
rgidy,i = 0.
The party Xi cannot learn input of Yi, because the sum xi.yi is masked by
a random value rgid,i. Neither can Xi learn the input of Xj (i 6= j) due to the
property of the secure sum service. The delegates can neither learn the inter-
mediate sum xi.yi because they are encrypted with data owners’ keys, nor the
final scalar product because Ssum does not reveal the final sum to the delegates.
In ComputeScalar, the delegates play two roles: forwarding messages between
parties and performing secure sum computations. For the former, the delegates
cannot be lazy without being detected, because messages are acknowledged (so
they cannot be skipped) and freshly signed (so they cannot be replayed). For
the latter, the secure sum protocol ensures that lazy behavior will be reliably
detected.
It can be seen that delegates are more involved in this service than in Ssum
or in Sset. In particular, they must keep track of the group to which each party
belongs, and must forward messages to the correct delegates. This management
task, if left to the data owners, may become impractical for large systems. Since
CloudMine is a cloud-based service, such tasks can be performed by the cloud
in a scalable way.
4 Data Mining in Hybrid Clouds
The hybrid cloud model, in which the user utilizes the combined resources of its
private infrastructure (or private cloud) and a public cloud, helps ease the tran-
sition from in-house to public-cloud computing. This model is motivated by the
need to optimize cost and performance, to cater for different demand patterns,
or to mitigate risks [18]. In this section, we demonstrate how CloudMine’s se-
cure sum service can be used to implement distributed, privacy-preserving data
mining algorithms in this hybrid environment.
We consider data owners as hybrid-cloud users, who partition their data into
two parts: the sensitive part maintained in the private cloud, and the less sen-
sitive part stored in a public cloud [46]. For example, data generated by an
intrusion detection system may consist of highly sensitive records associated
with the internal system, whereas traffic to/from the front-end servers may be
regarded as less sensitive. Another example is in large scale genomic sequencing:
an individual’s DNA sequence is highly sensitive and must be handled in the
private cloud, whereas a reference genome can be considered as less sensitive
and therefore can be encrypted and outsourced to a public cloud [12]. Note that
less sensitive is not the same as non-sensitive, in the sense that data owners still
want to have some levels of privacy with the less sensitive data. We distinguish
two logically separate delegates: a computation delegate which runs CloudMine
service, and a data delegate which maintains the owner’s data. They may be-
long to the same cloud, or each to a different cloud. Adversary model for the
computation delegates is the same as in the previous section. Adversary model
for the data delegates adversary model is also curious-and-lazy. In particular,
they try to learn the data stored on the public clouds, and try to do as little as
possible when answering data queries from the owners. They may collude with
each other, but they will not tamper with the data.
To protect the outsourced data from curious delegates, an encryption scheme
must be used. In our design, we employ two encryptions scheme: AES and Order-
Preserving Encryption (OPE) [10,33]. AES is a deterministic scheme that sup-
ports equality comparison of ciphertexts. OPE offers weaker security guarantees,
but it supports inequality comparison of ciphertexts, which can be used for range
queries. For the sake of simplicity, we store two encrypted copies of the data on
the data delegates (a more elegant approach can be found in CryptDB [34]).
We use the OPE scheme from [10], which is a stateless encryption and does not
require a third-party server (as in [33]).
Untrusted data delegates necessitate protocols for ensuring query assurance.
In the literature, techniques for query assurance are probablistic which make use
of redundant query execution (ringer schemes) [37,14,27]. In this work, we use
a mechanism based on [37], in which the data owner maintains a random, small
portion of the outsourced data in its private cloud. Queries to the delegates are
extended with a number of fake queries, and the results are probabilistically
checked by querying the local copy of the data. Our experiments show that
maintaining as little as 15 − 20% of the outsourced data locally is sufficiently
effective to detect lazy delegates after a small number of checks.
In the following, the data mining algorithms are run on the private cloud of
each data owner. We assume, for simplicity, that data is in relational format and
every attribute belongs to a non-negative integer domain. The algorithms consist
of an iterative process of querying the public-cloud database, combining it with
the local data, and using the result as inputs to the secure sum service. The
fact that outputs from the interactions with the data delegates are used during
the computations involving cloud delegates may appear to be a risk to privacy,
especially when data and computation delegates collude (which is immediate
when they belong to the same cloud provider).However, privacy is ensured for
two reasons. First, the computation delegates cannot learn the data owners’
inputs to the private computation, because the inputs are obtained over both
the data stored in the private cloud and data outsourced to the data delegate.
Hence, results from querying the data delegates only contribute partly to the
inputs. Second, and more importantly, even if all the data is outsourced, the
delegates cannot collude and compute analytics by themselves, because both
the data and the meta-data (column names, table names, etc.) are encrypted.
4.1 Classification (Naive Bayes).
A classification algorithm takes as input a set of labeled, training data and
outputs a classifier that can be used to assign label to new data. Let N be the
number of data instances, Y the set of labels, A the set of attributes and Va the
Algorithm 1: Naive Bayes classification
1 Input: Y,A, V, i
2 Output: N, {Ny}, {Ny,a,v}
3 PK← Setup(κ); SK← KeyGen(PK); MaKi ← MaskGen(i,PK)
4 foreach y ∈ Y, a ∈ A, v ∈ Va:
5 N iy ← QueryCount(label = y)
6 N iy,a,v ← QueryCount(a = v, label = y)
7 foreach y ∈ Y, a ∈ A, v ∈ Va:
8 Ny ← ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, N iy)
9 Ny,a,v ← ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, N iy,a,v)
attribute domain for a ∈ A. The NaiveBayes algorithm shown in Algorithm 1
computes:
classifier = (N, {Ny | y ∈ Y }, {Ny,a,v | y ∈ Y, a ∈ A, v ∈ Va})
The label for a new instance x is:
label(x) = argmaxy(
Ny
N
.
∏
i
Ny,i,xi
Ny
)
The protocol QueryCount(a1 = v1, a2 = v2..) encrypts a1, v1 with AES and
issues a SQL query of the form
select COUNT from Encaes(Data)
where Encaes(a1) = Encaes(v1)
AND Encaes(a2) = Encaes(v2) ..
to the data delegate. The delegate executes the SQL query over the encrypted
data and returns the result which is probabilistically verified by the owner.
4.2 Clustering (K-Mode).
A clustering algorithm partitions the data into separate clusters such that dis-
tance between members of the same cluster is smaller than that between mem-
bers of different clusters. The K-Mode algorithm (Algorithm 2) finds k clusters
identified by their centroids (or modes) that minimizes the dissimilarity between
members of the same cluster (the Mode function). The algorithm works in mul-
tiple rounds until the set of modes converges.
We use Manhattan distance to quantify the distance from a data instance x
to a mode c, i.e. ∆(x, c) =
∑
i |xi − ci|. The protocol QueryGroupBy(a,mi,M)
queries the data delegate for a list of frequencies for attribute a in the portion
Algorithm 2: K-Mode Clustering
1 Input: k,A, i
2 Output: M = {m1, ..,mk}
3 PK← Setup(κ); SK← KeyGen(PK); MaKi ← MaskGen(i,PK)
4 Initialize mj = {j, j, .., j} for mj ∈M Ci = ∅
5 foreach mj ∈M :
6 Cpmj = ∅
7 foreach a ∈ A
8 Cimj (a)← QueryGroupBy(a,mj ,M)
9 Cimj = C
i
mj ∪ Cimj (a)
10 Ci = Cp ∪ Cimj
11 foreach Ci[j] ∈ Ci:
12 C[j]← ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, Ci[j])
13 Ci ← C
14 foreach mj ∈M,a ∈ A:
15 mj(a)← Mode(Cimj (a))
16 Repeat Step 5 until M converges.
of data closest to the centroid mi ∈M . The query has the form:
select Encaes(a), COUNT from Encaes(Data) as freq
where ∆(Encope(a),Encope(mi)) < ∆(Encope(a),Encope(m0))
AND ∆(Encope(a),Encope(mi)) < ∆(Encope(a),Encope(m1))..
Group by Encaes(a), Order by Encope(a)
Since ∆ is computed over OPE ciphertext, the response from the cloud for
QueryGroupBy might not be accurate, as compared to the same query executed
over the plaintext data. OPE’s only guarantee is Encope(x) < Encope(y)↔ x < y,
hence it does not always follow that |Encope(x) − Encope(x′)| < |Encope(y) −
Encope(y
′)| ↔ |x − x′| < |y − y′|. In the next section, we show that this phe-
nomenon occurs frequently, yet the final clusters are very close to the clusters
found using the unencrypted data.
4.3 Association rule mining (Apriori).
An association rule mining algorithm extracts the relationships between at-
tributes that occur frequently in the data. An association rule has the form
(X → Y ) where X,Y ⊆ A. The Apriori algorithm (Algorithm 3) first determines
frequent item-sets containing a single item using the GenerateFrequentItemset-
Size1 protocol. The results are merged into larger item-sets (candidates) using
GenerateCandidates. The threshold value minsup specifies the lower bound for
item-set frequency. These steps are repeated until there is no more item-set to be
found. Finally, GenerateRules generates the outputs by establishing rules whose
Algorithm 3: Apriori association rule mining
1 Input: minsup, minconf, i
2 Output: set of rules {(X → Y )}
3 PK← Setup(κ); SK← KeyGen(PK); MaKi ← MaskGen(i,PK)
4 L1 ← GenerateFrequentItemsetSize1 ()
5 k = 2, Bi = ∅
6 Ck ← GenerateCandidates(Lk−1)
7 foreach c ∈ Ck:
8 t← QueryCount(c)
9 Bi = Bi ∪ t
10 foreach j ∈ [1, k]:
11 B[j]← ComputeSum(i,PK,SK,MaKi, Bi[j])
12 extract c.count from B[j]
13 Lk ← {c ∈ Ck|c.count ≥ minsup}
14 Increase k and repeat from line 6 until Lk = ∅
15 GenerateRules(
⋃
k Lk,minconf )
confidence values are above minconf . The details of GenerateFrequentItemset-
Size1, GenerateCandidates and GenerateRules can be found in [7].
5 Evaluation
We have implemented the protocols described in the previous sections in order
to demonstrate CloudMine’s functionality as well as to preliminarily assess its
performance in a hybrid cloud environment. In particular, the prototype im-
plements the secure sum service and three data mining algorithms built using
this service. It is written in Java, with cryptographic operations provided by the
Crypto++ library [1], OPE and Paillier encryptions by CryptDB library [34].
Data mining algorithms made use of the Weka library [29]. Communications
between data owners and delegates are done via Java sockets. The source code
is available at https://code.google.com/p/cloudmine-sum/.
Parameters Description Values
n number of parties 2, 4, 8, 16
k number of delegates 1, 2, 4, 8, 16
it EC2 instance types small, medium, large
bl encryption bit length 512, 1024
r secure sum request rate 10, 100, 200, 400, 700
ds dataset breast cancer, x50 breast cancer, mush-
room, x50 mushroom, splice,x10 splice
alg data mining algorithm NaiveBayes, Apriori, K-Mode
Table 1: List of parameters used in experiments.
We first experimented with CloudMine as a stand-alone service. We used
throughput — the number of secure sum operations completed per second mea-
sured at the party— as the metric. Next, we evaluated the performance of Cloud-
Mine when being used in complex data mining algorithms. For this, we measured
the overall and detailed breakdown of the running time of each data mining
algorithm. We ran all experiments on Amazon EC2 platform [9], using the pa-
rameters as listed in Table 1. Unless otherwise stated, each delegate runs on one
large EC2 instance, and two parties share one large EC2 instance. In addition,
n = k = 8 and bl = 1024. The results presented below are averaged over multiple
runs.
5.1 Secure Sum Benchmark
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Fig. 1: Secure sum throughput
To benchmark CloudMine service, we varied the frequency at which each
party requests for the service from its delegate. We also varied the types of EC2
instances on which the party is run, and the number of parties sharing one in-
stance. Figure 1[a] shows that throughput reaches its steady state at different val-
ues for different configurations of the party. In particular, the highest throughput
is observed at 150 (sums/sec) when one party occupies one large instance. When
two parties share the same instance, throughput dips to around 110 (sums/sec).
When medium or small instances are used for the parties, throughput falls even
further (the lowest is at 33 (sums/sec) with parties sharing small instances).
These results indicate with fixed n and k, throughput depends on the computa-
tion at the parties, i.e. the more powerful the parties are, the higher the overall
throughput. Furthermore, considering that our prototype implementation has
not been optimized for highly parallel workload, we believe these throughputs
are practical for many real-time applications in which data does not arrive at
extremely high rates.
Figure 1[b] shows how throughput also depends on encryption bit-length bl,
the ratio kn and the number of parties n. It can be easily seen that reducing the
encryption bit-length from 1024 to 512 leads to substantial increase in through-
put. This is because Paillier encryption and decryption operations take roughly
1ms when bl = 512, which rise to 7ms with bl = 1024. The ratio kn represents the
level of decentralization. When k = 1, all parties communicate to one centralized
delegate — the model adopted in [15,36,26]. When k = n, each party has one
delegate and each delegate has one party. The results indicate that throughput
is always slightly higher when k = 1 than when k = n. This means that through-
put is mainly determined by the sum computation, as opposed to be affected by
the communication overhead incurred when k = n. In other words, our service
supports the decentralization of the multi-party computation with minimal cost
to the overall performance. Thus, there is no substantial advantage, at least in
terms of throughput, in using a centralized service for secure sum computation;
whereas distributing this private computation over multiple delegates implies
the decentralization of trust, which is a more acceptable model in practice. Fi-
nally, as n increases, we can observe a drop in throughput. This is caused by
the computation and communication overhead incurred at the delegates when n
gets larger. We will discuss this overhead in more detail shortly.
5.2 Data Mining Performance
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Fig. 2: One-time cost
We used three standard datasets: breast cancer (small), mushroom (large,
many rows) and splice (large, many columns) from [4], and synthesized larger
datasets by extending them with random values from similar distributions. For
instance, x50 mushroom represents the dataset 50-time the size of the original
mushroom dataset. The largest dataset consists of 91350 rows and 23 columns.
In our prototype, each data owner encrypts its data with AES and OPE
and uploads it to the delegate which then stores it in a MySQL server. We let
data owners outsource all of their data to the cloud, causing larger data query
overhead than when parts of the data are stored locally. The encrypted datasets
were as much as 23 times larger in size than the original, unencrypted ones
(for the x10 splice dataset). We quantify the costs for database encryption at
the party and database loading at the delegate, which incur only once at the
beginning, in terms of the time taken to complete the operations. Figure 2[a]
illustrates these costs with varying datasets for the NaiveBayes algorithm. It
can be seen that both encryption and loading time are proportional to the data
size, and they remain below 8s even for the largest dataset. Figure 2[b] shows
the loading time at the delegates when delegates are running on different types
of EC2 instances. Across all datasets, using small instances results in longer
loading time.
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As explained in Section 4, a data mining application built using CloudMine
consists of two iterative, interleaving processes: database query and secure sum.
Figure 3 shows the breakdown costs of these processes — measured as the time
taken to complete the process — for Apriori algorithm. One important obser-
vation is that database query time is always greater than secure sum time. For
x50 mushroom dataset, the former takes more than an order of magnitude longer
to complete. The longest experiment (with x10 splice dataset) took 12 minutes
to complete, of which secure sum operation accounted for only 2 minutes. This
suggests that when used in real data mining algorithms, the cost of the secure
sum service has small effect on the overall performance. Figure 4 shows the effect
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of increasing data size to the database query time for different algorithms. It can
be observed that query time scales differently for different algorithms. Partic-
ularly, Apriori demonstrates the sharpest growth as compared to NaiveBayes
and K-Mode. We attribute this to the intrinsic properties of the data mining
algorithm. Specifically, we observe that in our experiments with Apriori, larger
datasets led to more queries being performed by the delegate (from 132 with
mushroom to 4214 with the x50 mushroom dataset).
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Finally, we investigated the cost of the secure sum service as being used in
data mining algorithms. Figure 5 shows this cost varies with n for the Apriori
algorithm. As the number of parties gets larger, the secure sum cost also in-
creases, albeit at a sub-linear rate. This is consistent to what has been observed
in Figure 1[b]. Recall that the cost of a secure sum operation comprises the en-
cryption/decryption cost at the party and the computation and communication
cost at the delegates. The former is shown in Figure 5 to be almost constant,
meaning that the overhead incurred when n increases can be attributed to the
overhead at the delegate. Firsts, each delegate needs to perform more multipli-
cations when n increases. Second, each will have to wait longer to receive all the
messages from other delegates when n becomes bigger.
Correctness of K-Mode. As explained in Section 4, the QueryGroupBy pro-
tocol in K-Mode may return a different result as compared to performing the
corresponding query locally on the plaintext data. We refer to this as mismatched
query, whose error may affect the convergence rate of the algorithm as well as
the final clusters. All of our experiments with K-Mode converged to final modes.
To quantify the differences between clusters found by using CloudMine and what
are found using standard K-Mode over plaintext data, we used an error metric
(Ci, C
′
i) =
|Ω(Ci)−Ω(C′i)|
Ω(C′i)
where Ci, C
′
i denote the two clusters and Ω(Ci) is the
mean squared distance of the members of Ci to the mode. While the average
number of mismatched queries ranges from 0 (for mushroom dataset) to 508.2
(for splice dataset), the maximum error is 0.03. This means our protocols yield
nearly identical clusters to what obtained from the standard K-Mode.
5.3 Discussion.
The results above have demonstrated that there are overhead incurred by cryp-
tographic operations when using CloudMine, as compared to when the data
owners use their own infrastructure and directly take part in the multi-party
protocol with each other. While these costs are necessary to provide security in
the presence of the delegates, we also remark that when used in the context of
data mining, they become less substantial, and can be more than offset by the
benefits gained from using elastic cloud resources. In particular, let m be the
number of secure sum messages sent and received by the data owners during
a data mining algorithm. Let α be the cryptographic cost for encrypting and
decrypting a message (with additive homomorphic encryption schemes). Let q
be the number of database queries and cq the CPU cost for each query. The
computation overhead at each data owner becomes O = (Cd−C) = (α.m−q.cq)
where C is the cost when the data owner uses its own infrastructure. It can be
seen that O diminishes quickly and becomes negative for larger workloads: more
complex data mining algorithms with high value of q or larger datasets with high
cq. It has been shown in Figure 3, for example, that the database query costs
may be over an order of magnitude more than the costs incurred by the secure
sum service.
6 Related Work
CloudMine shares common goals with many other works in the area of dis-
tributed, privacy-preserving data analytics. Our work is not based on random-
ization approach [8] which perturbs the inputs or differential privacy [16] ap-
proach which adds noise to the outputs. Instead, CloudMine follows the secure
multi-party computation approach [45] in preserving data privacy during com-
putation. It has been shown that any computation can be done in a private
manner, by reducing the computation to a combination of circuits. Vaidya et
al. [40] use generic circuits for evaluating 2-party comparison operation, which
is then used for K-Means algorithm over vertically partitioned data. Yang et
al [44] use generic circuits for computing Bayesian networks on vertically par-
titioned data. CloudMine does not rely on circuit evaluation, which is either
expensive [15] or is restricted to two-party computation [25]. Instead, it shares
similar model to what is proposed in [15,26,36,35] which rely on third-party
servers. However, these works focus on specific functions for specific application
domains. In contrast, CloudMine is designed in a service-oriented manner, that
can be flexibly used by a wide range of applications. Furthermore, the adversary
model of CloudMine is stronger than in the aforementioned previous works.
Our delegated computation model is a special case of verifiable computa-
tion, in which a client outsources its computations to a more powerful entity
and is able to later verify the outputs. Theoretical results have shown that any
computation can be outsourced with guaranteed input and output privacy [19].
However, a general protocol for outsourced computation is inefficient [41]. [22,21]
propose to detect cheating and mis-computation at the expense of data privacy,
but they rely on probabilistic checking and require the client to pre-compute
the results or the delegate to commit certain values. Wang et al. [41,42] propose
practical methods to outsource linear programming to the cloud. However, they
consider a single data owner and delegate, as opposed to CloudMine’s multi-
party model.
Finally, existing works on security of outsourced databases focus on data
privacy [34], query freshness [30,23] and query completeness [28]. These works
complement the protocols we described in Section 4 (which deal with data pri-
vacy and query completeness).
7 Conclusions and Future work
In this paper, we have described a cloud-based service, named CloudMine, which
allows multiple data owners to carry out analytics over their joint data in a
privacy-preserving manner. The computation is outsourced to a number of in-
dependent clouds (or delegates). CloudMine protects data privacy and ensures
correctness of the computation against the standard semi-honest model of the
data owners, and against the curious-and-lazy delegate model. CloudMine sup-
ports three analytic functions: secure sum, secure set union and intersection,
and secure scalar product. These primitives can be used to implement a wide
range of complex data mining algorithms. We demonstrated this by showing
how a simple instance of CloudMine (the secure sum service) can be used in
a hybrid cloud environment for the classification, association rule mining and
clustering algorithms. We discussed the mechanisms designed to ensure privacy
when the data is stored in a public cloud. Finally, we implemented a prototype
of CloudMine’s secure sum service and evaluated the performance of the service
as a stand-alone application and as part of complex data mining applications.
The results demonstrate the service’s practical performance, and show that it
provides privacy with little cost to the overall performance for workloads that
are inherently computationally intensive.
Our current prototype has not implemented the protocols for bootstrapping
the CloudMine service. Dynamic group membership may affect the service and
its applications in interesting ways. Incorporating and evaluating these protocols,
and optimization of the overall implementation are parts of our immediate plan
for future work. We also plan to implement the protocols for secure set and
scalar product services. For the former, particularly, we intend to investigate
how existing protocols for private set intersection (which scale better than our
current protocol) can be modified to work in our delegate settings. Once being
equipped with these higher-level primitives, we can start looking at more complex
applications such as collaborative filtering. Additionally, we plan to explore if
the automated scaling features offered by some cloud platforms could improve
the performance of the service, especially under intensive workloads. Finally,
we would like to incorporate differential privacy techniques into the service and
investigate the maximum privacy budget needed to realize any given data mining
algorithm.
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